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MIND-WANDERING AND DRIVING: COMPARING THOUGHT REPORT AND 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE MEASURES 
 
Heather E.K. Walker, Lana M. Trick 
Department of Psychology, University of Guelph 
Guelph, Ontario, Canada 
Email: hrodd@uoguelph.ca 
 
Summary: Mind-wandering is a cognitive state in which attention is diverted 
from the main task and towards more personal thoughts, which can interfere with 
performance. This study investigated differences in patterns of mind-wandering 
and driving performance measured during thought-probe versus post-task self-
report conditions, and further differentiated based on individual differences in 
working memory—as measured by the Operation Span (OSPAN) and Sustained 
Attention to Response Task (SART). Participants completed two 30-minute drives. 
Those in the thought-probe condition were asked whether they were thinking of 
driving; the proportion of trials where they answered “no” was used as the index 
of mind-wandering. In the post-task condition participants estimated the 
percentage of time they had mind-wandered during each drive. Speed, steering 
variability, headway distance, and hazard response time to a lead vehicle braking 
were also measured. Results showed that the magnitude of mind-wandering 
captured in the thought-probe condition was greater than in the post-task 
condition, though hazard response times were also faster despite greater mind-
wandering reports. Higher OSPAN scores were associated with greater reports of 
mind-wandering, but only in the post-task condition. Conversely, in the post-task 
condition those with low SART scores responded slower to hazards than those 
with high scores; in the thought-probe condition these groups did not differ. 
Findings indicate a differential impact of report-type on participant experience, 
emphasizing the need for more covert measures of mind-wandering—e.g., eye-
tracking or electroencephalography—that provide accurate estimates of task 
engagement but don’t interfere with task flow. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Many drivers have had the experience of “coming to” in their driveway with little recollection of 
how they got from point A to B. This shift in attention away from a main task and towards one’s 
own thoughts is known as mind-wandering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), and there is already 
evidence that it can affect driving performance (e.g., He, Becic, Lee, & McCarley). Mind-
wandering is often measured using in-task thought probes or post-task self-reports, but despite 
often being treated as equivalent it is unclear whether these techniques capture the same overall 
experience of mind-wandering or the associated changes in driving performance. If not, this 
could contribute to unexpected conflicts in the literature. In this study we examine this problem 
by carrying out an investigation of mind-wandering in a driving simulator, measuring the 
incidence of mind-wandering using two different methods: in-task thought-probes, and post-task 
reports. We also compare driving performance between these conditions to determine whether 
report type may secondarily affect driving behaviour. To further investigate if each report type is 
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measuring the same experience, we also compare patterns of mind-wandering and driving 
performance between those who score high versus low on two individual differences measures. 
 
The study of mind-wandering and driving is not new. Research has revealed that drivers who are 
mind-wandering exhibit less complex eye movements and reduced horizontal visual scanning 
(He, Becic, Lee, & McCarley, 2011; Regan, Hallett, & Gordon, 2011), as well increased driving 
speeds and reduced headway distance (Yanko & Spalek, 2013; Walker & Trick, 2018)—all of 
which contribute to increased risk of collision. These effects can be further compounded by other 
factors such as familiarity with a route (Yanko & Spalek, 2013) or increased time spent driving 
(Walker & Trick, 2018)—both of which are a concern for commuters. 
 
In many of these investigations, the most practical way in which to measure participants’ mind-
wandering has been to ask them through self-report. Two types of self-report commonly used 
throughout the mind-wandering literature include in-task thought probes and post-task self-
reports (e.g., Smallwood & O’Connor, 2011). With probe-caught methods, auditory or visual 
cues prompt individuals to report whether they were mind-wandering in the past few moments, 
thus eliminating the need to always be aware of one’s thoughts. However, probe-caught methods 
create an interruption—both in the flow of the task, and in the train of thought. Post-test surveys, 
on the other hand, are less intrusive but rely on individuals being able to identify and then later 
remember whether (and how often) mind-wandering occurred during the task. As such, there is a 
risk that mind-wandering will be underestimated because individuals may forget that mind-
wandering occurred by the time the task is complete. Both approaches have advantages and 
disadvantages, and it is unclear whether the mind-wandering measured by these two techniques 
reflect identical experiences of off-task thought. If they do not—but are compared as if they were 
are—this would cause confusion within the literature and could result in conflicting findings. 
 
If probe-caught and self-report techniques are indeed capturing the same experience, then the 
magnitude of mind-wandering and pattern of changes in driving performance associated by 
individual differences in factors such as working memory (important in sustaining attention and 
coordinating action when attention is shared between two tasks, Watkins, 2008) should be 
similar between the two report-types. Two common measures of working memory are the 
OSPAN (Operation Span: Turner & Engle, 1989) and the SART (Sustained Attention Response 
Task: Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). The OSPAN measures ability to 
multitask and prioritize task goals over distracting stimuli (e.g., remembering an increasingly 
long list of random letters while at the same time carrying out simple mental calculations). The 
SART measures ability to maintain focused attention through a sequence of rapidly presented 
stimuli (e.g., numbers presented in rapid succession), responding and withholding response as 
instructed. It has been demonstrated that lower scores on these tasks are associated with greater 
instances of off-task thought, and it is hypothesized that those who perform poorly on these tasks 
are more likely to experience mind-wandering—as well as its associated performance deficits—
in other day-to-day tasks as well (Kane & McVay, 2012). 
 
In the present study we investigated mind-wandering and driving performance in a driving 
simulator under two self-report conditions: in-task thought probes, and post-task self-reports. 
Although they measure mind-wandering in different ways, results uncovered using these 
methods are often treated as equivalent in the literature, and so we wanted to examine the 
proportions of mind-wandering being reported by each approach. Because individuals may forget 
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that they were mind-wandering by the end of the task, we expected that lower magnitudes of 
mind-wandering would be captured by post-task self-reports. We also examined whether driving 
performance was also affected by how mind-wandering is measured. Interrupting the flow of the 
task to make a report versus carrying out an entire drive uninterrupted could have a differential 
impact on participants’ driving performance, and so we suspected that driving performance 
would be better in the thought-probe condition as compared to the post-task condition. To further 
investigate whether each report type was measuring the same overall experience, we used the 
OSPAN and the SART to examine patterns of individual differences in mind-wandering and 
driving performance in each report type. Because both tasks measure overall working memory, it 
should be expected that patterns of mind-wandering and driving performance associated with 
high versus low scores on either of these tasks would be the same regardless of report type—if 
indeed they are measuring the same thing. 
 
METHODS 
 
Participants 
 
Sixty-three licensed undergraduate students—a population more prone to mind-wandering (e.g., 
Zavagnin, Borella, & De Beni, 2014)—were recruited from the University of Guelph’s 
psychology participant pool (38 female, M age = 19.19, SD = 2.13), and received course credit 
for their participation. All had at least a G2 license or better, which in Ontario’s graduate 
licensing program signifies that the driver is entitled to drive unsupervised. 70% of all 
participants had a G2 license, with the remaining possessing a full (G) license. 
 
Apparatus and Stimuli 
 
This study was carried out using a fixed-base Oktal driving simulator, consisting of a Pontiac G6 
convertible surrounded by 300O of viewing screens. The vehicle is equipped with the standard 
controls, including an automatic transmission. To further contribute to a realistic driving 
experience, the vehicle is also equipped with speakers and vibration transducers to simulate the 
sounds and vibrations experienced during acceleration, as well as force feedback in the steering 
wheel to simulate feedback experienced when steering a vehicle. 
 
Two similar highway drives were created, which took 30 minutes to complete at 100 km/h. 
Participants followed behind a lead vehicle throughout each drive and were told to maintain an 
appropriate following distance. Near the end of each drive the lead vehicle braked unexpectedly, 
and participants had to brake to avoid a collision. Hazard response time (RT) was calculated both 
as the time (in ms) between the lead vehicle braking and when participants lifted their foot off 
the gas pedal (gas RT), and the time between the lead vehicle braking and when participants 
applied brake pressure (brake RT). Other measures of driving performance included driving 
speed, standard deviation of lateral position (SDLP: standard deviation of the distance between 
the center of the vehicle and the center of the lane), and headway distance. These were measured 
during straight and uneventful highway portions where mind-wandering would likely occur. 
 
Two methods were used to measure mind-wandering. In the thought-probe condition, at six 
points throughout each drive a pre-recorded voice was played asking, “Are you thinking about 
driving?” On the dashboard above the center console were two buttons labelled “Y” and “N”. If 
participants were thinking of driving, they pressed “Y”. If not, they pressed “N”. Of interest was 
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the proportion (%) of total probes to which participants responded “N” (i.e., were mind-
wandering). In the post-task condition, participants were asked to estimate the proportion (%) of 
time they felt they had spent mind-wandering during each drive. 
 
Individual differences were assessed using two measures of executive working memory. In the 
OSPAN, participants were presented with math equations and first had to determine whether the 
given answer was true or false, after which they were shown a letter which they were told to hold 
in memory. After several math equation and letter pairs, they were asked to recall the letters in 
the order they were presented. The number of equations and thus letters to be recalled were 
increased until participants could no longer recall the letters correctly on 3 successive trials. 
Scoring was based on the total number of correct answers. For the SART—a go/no-go task—
participants’ task was to tap an iPod screen every time a number appeared (“go” items), except 
when that number was a “5” (“no-go” item). Of interest was total test accuracy, a percent-correct 
score which factors in correct responses to both “go” (respond) and “no-go” (withhold) items. 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the thought-probe or post-task condition. Upon 
arrival for the experiment, participants were presented with the informed consent information. To 
avoid making them wise to the full purpose of the experiment, participants were not informed of 
what to expect during the drives (i.e., that the lead vehicle would be braking), apart from the fact 
that they would be responding to yes/no questions during the drives (thought-probes) or rating 
their experience after the drives (post-task reports). However, they were not informed as to the 
specific content of these questions. After filling out intake questionnaires that collected basic 
demographics and driving experience information, participants completed a five-minute practice 
drive to become familiar with the feeling of being in the simulator and with piloting the vehicle. 
They were then administered both the OSPAN and the SART. Following this they completed the 
two experimental drives, the order of which was counterbalanced across participants.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Design. This study involved two between-subject’s factors: report type (thought-probe, post-
task), and executive working memory (high, low), the latter of which was determined using a 
median split of both OSPAN and SART scores. Data analyses involved analyses of variance 
(ANOVA, with Type III Sums of Squares used when factorial analyses were conducted). Effect 
sizes were measured using eta-squared ( ) and partial eta-squared ), which represent the 
proportion of variance accounted for by each experimental factor. When tests of means were 
performed, a Bonferroni correction was used to correct for multiple comparisons. 
 
Report type. One-way ANOVA were used to compare mind-wandering and driving performance 
between the two report types. The proportion of mind-wandering reported in the thought-probe 
condition was higher than estimates from the post-task condition (F(1,61) = 4.61, p = .036,  = 
.07, Mdiff = 14.71%) (Fig. 1 left). Comparisons of driving performance revealed that gas RTs 
were higher in the post-task condition than in the thought-probe condition (F(1,51) = 4.66, p = 
.036,  = .084, Mdiff = 389.5ms) (Fig. 1 middle). A similar pattern emerged for braking RTs, 
though it was only marginal (F(1,49) = 3.51, p = .067,  = .067, Mdiff = 387.15ms) (Fig. 1 
right). Other comparisons of driving performance revealed no difference. 
PROCEEDINGS of the Tenth International Driving Symposium on Human Factors in Driver Assessment,  
Training and Vehicle Design 
12 
 
               
 
Figure 1. Reported mind-wandering (Left), gas RT (Middle), and brake RT (Right) for each report condition. 
Standard error bars included 
 
Individual differences. To confirm that differences between report conditions were due to 
experimental manipulation and not to pre-existing differences between groups, comparisons of 
overall OSPAN and SART performance between each group were carried out. Results showed no 
difference in participants’ overall OSPAN scores (F(1,62) = 2.39, p = .128,  = .038) or SART 
scores (F(1,61) = 1.02, p = .318,  = .017). Participants scores were then divided into high and 
low OSPAN or SART performance groups based on a median split of overall scores for each test 
(OSPAN median = 18 (out of 25); SART median = 95.2% accuracy). 
 
In contrast to overall comparisons between the report conditions, when the impact of individual 
differences in working memory on reports of mind-wandering were examined, separate one-way 
ANOVA were used. In the post-task condition, individuals with high OSPAN scores estimated 
mind-wandering marginally more often than those with low scores (F(1,29) = 3.86, p = .059,  
= .12, Mdiff = 14.47%) (Figure 2). The proportion of mind-wandering reported in the thought-
probe condition followed a similar pattern, though this difference was not close to significance 
(F(1,30) = 1.48, p = .23,  = .047, Mdiff = 14.29%) (Fig. 2 left). When comparisons were made 
using high and low SART scores, no differences were found. 
 
2 X 2 factorial ANOVA were used to examine differences in driving performance, with report 
type (thought-probe, post-task) and SART or OSPAN score (high, low) as between-subjects’ 
factors. We found an interaction between report type and SART scores on braking RTs (F(1,45) = 
4.70, p = .014,  = .17) (Fig. 2 middle). In the post-task condition those with low SART scores 
had marginally higher braking RTs than those with higher scores (Mdiff = 633.17ms, SE = 
323.22ms, p = .056, while in the thought-probe condition there was no difference between the 
two (Mdiff = 80.0ms, SE = 227.06ms, p =1). Furthermore, low scorers in the post-task condition 
had higher braking RTs than low scorers in the thought-probe condition (Mdiff = 770.60ms, SE = 
269.74ms, p = .008), whereas there was no difference between the two conditions for those with 
higher scores (Mdiff = 57.50ms SE = 275.02ms, p = 1). An interaction between report type and 
SART scores was also found for gas RTs (F(1,47) = 3.62, p = .034,  = .134) (Fig. 2 right). 
Specifically, in the post-task condition those with low SART scores had higher gas RTs than 
individuals with higher scores (Mdiff = 645.06ms, SE = 294.94ms, p = .023), while in the 
thought-probe condition there was no such difference (Mdiff = 91.0ms, SE = 184.10ms, p = 1). 
Additionally, low scorers in the post-task condition had higher gas RTs than low scorers in the 
thought-probe condition (Mdiff = 674.06ms, SE = 259.33ms, p = .007), while those with high 
scores did not differ between the two report conditions (Mdiff = 120.0ms, SE = 144.25ms, p = 1). 
Other comparisons of driving performance revealed no differences. 
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Figure 2. Individual differences in mind-wandering as indicated by OSPAN performance (Left), individual 
differences in brake RT (Middle) and gas RT (Right) as indicated by SART performance, for each report 
condition. Standard error bars included 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
As predicted, the magnitude of mind-wandering captured in the thought-probe condition was 
greater than that estimated by post-task self-reports. This is not to say that less mind-wandering 
was experienced by those in the post-task condition, only that individuals may not have been 
aware of it or simply forgot, and so a portion of episodes went unreported. Looking to measures 
of driving performance, only hazard RTs differed between the two report conditions. Hazard RTs 
were faster in the thought-probe condition, even though more mind-wandering was reported. 
Two explanations are possible: interrupting thought-probes might have reduced the impact that 
extended mind-wandering had on driving behaviour, and so performance was better. 
Alternatively, if individuals in the post-task condition are mind-wandering more than is being 
reported, it would contribute to the longer RTs that were observed. 
 
For comparisons involving individual differences, only the OSPAN was associated with 
differences in reported mind-wandering. Those with high scores reported more-mind-wandering 
than those with low scores, though only to a marginal degree in the post-task condition. It is 
certainly possible that these individuals mind-wandered more than those with low scores. 
However, because the OSPAN measures ability to keep items in memory while completing a 
second task, it is also likely that they were simply better at recognizing they were mind-
wandering. Conversely, only the SART was associated with differences in driving performance. 
Those with low scores experienced longer hazard RTs, though only in the post-task condition. 
Again, it is possible that thought-probes brought attention back on-task just enough to eliminate 
noticeable differences between the two groups. Overall, patterns of mind-wandering and driving 
performance associated with high and low scores on each task were not the same between the 
two report conditions, as would be expected if each report type were surveying the same 
experience. Instead, it suggests the opposite, that the behaviours observed when using thought-
probes are not necessarily the same as those observed when using post-task reports. 
 
Although no firm conclusions should be made about the strengths of each report type, it could be 
that thought-probes are ideal when accurate estimates of mind-wandering are required, whereas 
post-task reports are ideal when performance is the focus. Nevertheless, these results imply that 
conclusions made in experiments using one measurement type are not necessarily generalizable 
to other experiments or contexts—though they are often treated as such in the literature—and so 
caution and scrutiny should be used when interpreting such findings. There are other general 
implications as well. Care should be taken when choosing a measurement approach, as certain 
methods may not accurately represent how much mind-wandering has occurred. Furthermore, 
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measures should be chosen carefully to minimize any secondary impact on associated behaviours 
that are also being measured. This highlights the need for more covert measures of mind-
wandering—for example, eye-tracking or electroencephalography (EEG)—that provide accurate 
estimates of attention towards the task but don’t interfere with task flow. 
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